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Abstract  
This paper challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by 
arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such 
as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators 
engage in the caucus system in order to maximize the social utility of their relationships.  
Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain 
the types of legislators that benefit most from the caucus network.  We collect data on the 
complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th 
U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network and regression analyses to 
find evidence that the caucus system both supports the hierarchical structure of the formal 
leadership institutions and offers a meaningful way for all members to establish and 
maintain relationships with their colleagues.
 2 
Introduction 
In this study we challenge the existing literature on caucuses in the U.S. Congress 
by arguing that the caucus system mirrors the formal organizing institutions, such as 
parties and committees, rather than acting as a structural counterbalance to these 
institutions.  The argument presented here focuses on caucuses as social institutions that 
provide legislators with the opportunity to interact with colleagues who might share 
interests, concerns, or who might help them advance their position in the institution.  Our 
study differs from prior studies on caucuses in two primary ways.  First, while prior 
research conveys caucuses as institutions that help legislators at a structural disadvantage 
(such as junior members), we view the caucus system as a mirror of existing ingrained 
institutions that provide power to those who are leaders, more senior, or electorally safe.  
Second, we collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members that 
allows us to engage in a social network analysis of caucuses.  Our data allow us to 
discern whether those at a structural or social disadvantage effectively use the caucus 
system to connect to their colleagues and we find no support for the conventional 
wisdom.  Rather, much like parties and committees, caucuses help those with power to 
maintain power and may provide no additional network advantage to legislators who are 
looking for a way to improve their status in the Congress.     
 Existing literature suggests that the caucus system, as an informal institution 
within the Congress, benefits those legislators who find themselves relatively 
disadvantaged within the formal legislative structure (see especially Ainsworth and Akins 
1997; Hammond 1998). In other words, the caucus system constitutes an alternative 
institutional framework within which rank-and-file members, junior legislators, 
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preferences outliers, and other actors in formally weak positions can build their 
reputations in the legislature and gain influence on policy-making processes and 
outcomes. 
 Our conception of the caucus system as a social network challenges this view. We 
consider the caucus system to be an informal institution that allows legislators to build 
and maintain relationships within the House. Not all relationships are created equal, 
however, and being associated with some colleagues is more valuable to individual 
members than others. Therefore, legislators engage in the caucus system in an effort to 
maximize the social utility of their relationships. They achieve this goal by associating 
themselves with those actors who are already powerful within the formal institutional 
structure, because being connected to a party or committee leader, or to a senior 
colleague, is more valuable than being linked to just another rank-and-file member. As a 
result, we expect the caucus system not to serve as an alternative institutional structure 
utilized primarily by formally disadvantaged members of the House to counter-balance 
their structural weaknesses, but to constitute an informal institutional framework that 
replicates and reinforces the formal distribution of power and influence within the 
legislature. Our analysis of the caucus network in the 110th Congress supports this 
updated view of the purpose of caucuses.  We show that formally powerful players, such 
as legislative leaders and senior members, are both more connected and more central 
within the caucus network.  
 Our study goes beyond previous research on caucuses in the Congress in 
theoretical, methodological, and empirical terms. Theoretically, the existing literature 
does not account for the inherent social nature of caucuses, while our paper is built on the 
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contention that research on legislative organization should account for the social 
relationships between legislators as much as the characteristics of individuals. In 
methodological terms, using social network analysis allows us to test the validity of 
existing accounts of caucuses in the House of Representatives beyond what traditional 
qualitative and quantitative methods have to offer. It allows us to evaluate the received 
wisdom on congressional caucuses in a more extensive and refined fashion. Finally, our 
dataset on caucus memberships is the most comprehensive one to date because we 
analyze legislators’ self-reports of caucuses they joined and we use this information to 
generate complete caucus membership lists, which are not otherwise published.  
 
Legislatures as Social Networks 
The idea that networks are inherent in politics is not new, and political scientists 
have incorporated the concepts of interdependence into empirical and game theoretic 
models for many years. While political scientists have hesitated to adopt the distinctly 
sociological method and structural analysis that have become popular in other academic 
disciplines, political scientists would be remiss to conclude that the basic assumptions of 
rational choice theory are at odds with social network analysis. Knoke has offered that 
game theory and social network analysis are logically compatible because they both 
consider actors to be interdependent. “Game theory offers perhaps the best opportunity to 
integrate rational political theory with the structural approach” (Knoke 1990, 38). Social 
network analysis is becoming increasingly popular in political science and there is 
intellectual and methodological room for a new paradigmatic approach.  
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To date, there exist a few studies that examine legislatures as social networks. 
Some have examined social connectedness between legislators via cosponsorship 
behavior. Most notably, Fowler develops a measure of “connectedness” from bill 
cosponsorships that significantly predicts roll call vote choice, controlling for ideology 
and partisanship (2006). In addition, Gross and Shalizi examine cosponsorship networks 
while accounting for the systematic clustering of observations that is inherent in network 
data (2007; also see Burkett and Skvoretz 2001). Porter, et al. (2005) study linkages 
between legislators via committees and demonstrate connectivity between committees 
based on shared membership as well as hierarchical relationships between committees in 
the chamber. They use this information to reveal ideological preferences that predict roll 
call voting behavior, independent of party or other ideological measures. Whether 
through cosponsoring bills or committee service, there are clearly many ways for 
legislators to form networks with one another and studies are just beginning to tap the 
complexity and richness of these approaches (see also Whiteman 1995; Crisp, et al. 2004; 
Carpenter, et al. 2004; Esterling 2007; Koger, et al. 2008; Gimpel, et al. 2008). 
 
Caucuses in the Congress 
In this project we are interested in the social connections that legislators form 
through informal legislative organizations.i Most legislatures have formal means of 
organizing their members, most importantly through parties and committees. In addition, 
many legislatures have less formal organizations through which their members organize 
to express concern for common issues. In the United States Congress, for example, there 
are more than 400 legislative member organizations outside of the formal party caucuses, 
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which range in topic from the well-known Congressional Black Caucus to the Minor 
League Baseball Caucus.ii 
 The existing literature has identified three purposes of the caucus system. First, 
caucuses allow legislators to signal their policy preferences and priorities to their 
colleagues and constituents. Second, they serve as venues for the exchange of 
information within the legislature (Fiellin 1962; Ainsworth and Akins 1997; Stevens, 
Miller, and Mann 1974; Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist 1981). Third, they allow for 
the coordination of legislative action outside the formal party and committee structure 
(Fiellin 1962; Stevens, Miller, and Mann 1974; Loomis 1981; Hammond, Mulhollan and 
Stevens 1983; Miller 1990; Vega 1993; Hammond, et al. 1985, Hammond 1991, 1998). 
 Aside from specifying these three principal functions of the caucus system, the 
extant literature also identifies the primary users and beneficiaries of this informal 
legislative institution. As Ainsworth and Akins observe, much of the existing work on 
caucuses “has argued that caucuses augment the formal institutional structure of 
Congress by offering members a means to gain information and affect policy across 
conventional institutional boundaries, including those dividing committees, parties, and 
constitutencies” (1997, 408). In other words, existing research suggests that caucuses 
provide for an extensive, informal structure for legislative action that exists parallel to the 
formal institutional organization of parties and committees.  
Previous work also suggests that this informal structure allows those legislators 
who are relatively disadvantaged in the formal institutional framework of legislative 
politics to counter-balance their structural weaknesses by engaging themselves in the 
informal political arena of the caucus network. Hammond’s research, for example, argues 
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that that those who are advantaged in the formal institutional structure, such as party and 
committee leaders and senior legislators, are less likely to join and participate in 
legislative caucuses. Instead, it is junior members and those with no formal leadership 
position who use caucuses to advance their legislative objectives and to build their 
reputation and standing within the institution (Hammond 1998). Meanwhile, Ainsworth 
and Akins suggest that caucuses are composed of policy outliers, and that the caucus 
system exists to counterbalance the dominant committee system (Ainsworth and Akins 
1997). According to this research, caucus membership is not just about signaling, 
information exchange, and policy coordination, but also critically about advancing 
individual legislators’ political and policy ambitions. 
 Conceptualizing caucuses as a social network between legislators causes us to 
challenge the view that the caucus system is a sort of “welfare” system for disadvantaged 
legislators.  We consider the social nature of the caucus system to be the integral reason 
for its existence, and we maintain that joining and participating in caucuses is about 
building and maintaining relationships and associations with other legislators. We also 
assume that some relationships are more valuable than others. These two basic insights 
compel us to question some of the key propositions of the existing literature on caucuses 
in the House, most importantly the suggestion that caucuses exist in order to advance the 
interests and positions of those disadvantaged in the formal legislative structure of parties 
and committees.  
If it were true that the caucus system exists to supplement this formal legislative 
structure without replicating it, we should expect to find formally disadvantaged 
legislators to rise to “the top” of the caucus system. The people at the helm of the caucus 
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system should be different from those at the top of the formal legislative structure of 
parties and committees. If, on the other hand, caucus membership is about legislators 
trying to maximize the utility of their social connections, they should seek to connect to 
those colleagues who are already powerful within the formal legislative structure, such as 
party leaders, committee leaders, and senior members. If this were the case, however, we 
should expect legislators in formally powerful positions to be advantaged within the 
caucus system as well. According to this view of the caucus system, it does not simply 
supplement the formal legislative structure, but it replicates and reinforces the 
distribution of power and influence within it. If this proposition were correct, we should 
expect to find that: 
Hypothesis 1: Legislators who are party or committee leaders should join more 
caucuses and be both more connected and more central within the caucus 
network. 
Hypothesis 2: Senior members should join more caucuses and be both more 
connected and more central within the caucus network. 
These hypotheses directly contradict the existing literature.  If the existing 
conception of the caucus system reflects the make-up of the system, then party and 
committee leaders, as well as senior members, should not be more central in the caucus 
system because, according to prior studies on this subject, the caucus system exists to 
counterbalance the power networks found in the formal institutions within the House.  
However, if the caucus system is primarily a social network that provides legislators with 
the opportunity to cultivate valuable relationships, we should expect the structure of the 
caucus network to mirror the known power structure in the House. 
 9 
Further, electoral vulnerability is an indicator of structural strength within the 
institution of Congress.  If our theorized conception of the caucus network is accurate—
that it exists to reinforce the power of those with high rank in the traditional institutional 
structures—then those who do not live in fear of their next election should be at greater 
liberty to join caucuses and use them to enhance their position in the network.  We 
therefore expect that electorally safe legislators will join more caucuses and be more 
central and more connected via the caucus network. 
Hypothesis 3:  Electorally safe legislators should join more caucuses and be both 
more connected and more central within the caucus network. 
If, on the other hand, the existing literature were correct in arguing that the 
informal social structure provided by membership in caucuses constitutes an alternative 
avenue for legislative influence for those disadvantaged within the formal institutional 
structure, we should expect these disadvantaged legislators to seek membership in 
numerous caucuses and to try to become key players in the caucus network.  
While the extant literature on caucuses suggests that disadvantaged legislators are 
more likely to join and become key players in the caucus system than those who already 
hold positions of influence, it is somewhat vague on what it means by disadvantaged.  In 
addition to using a social network framework to challenge this view, we offer a more 
targeted theory about what it means to be a disadvantaged legislator.  The legislative 
characteristics described above—leadership, seniority, and electoral security—are 
examples of institutional advantages that some legislators have.  However, some 
legislators may have other characteristics, such as race or gender, that place them at a 
disadvantage.  Evidence suggests we should expect female legislators and racial 
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minorities to behave in a manner similar to other legislators with disadvantages—they 
should use the caucus system to help them overcome their disadvantages. 
We can go further in testing the applicability of the alternative institutional 
structure proposition by examining the positions of other disadvantaged members in the 
legislature. While we have hypothesized that being at a structural disadvantage in 
Congress would not make one more likely to join and be connected via caucuses, we can 
also test whether being at a social disadvantage has the same effect (e.g., being female or 
an ethnic minority).  We can further ask whether being a member of a socially 
disadvantaged group makes one more likely to use the caucus system crutch than one 
who is structurally disadvantaged.  Evidence shows that female legislators are at a 
disadvantage compared to male legislators when it comes to attaining positions of 
leadership, seniority, and preferred committee assignments (see McGlen and O’Connor 
1998, 88-90). In addition, legislators who are ethnic minorities may face a disadvantage 
in achieving legislative goals (Volden and Wiseman 2007).  While we do not dispute 
such evidence, we do not expect that being a member of a socially disadvantaged class 
makes one more likely to rely on the caucus system for network assistance than being a 
member of a structurally disadvantaged class.  Since we expect the caucus system to 
mirror the existing institutions in the House, we expect legislators’ structural positions to 
have a greater impact on their use of the caucus system than their gender or ethnic 
identity.   
 Hypothesis 4: Female and ethnic minority legislators are no more likely to join 
caucuses, to be more connected, and to be more central within the caucus 
network than male or Caucasian legislators. 
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Data 
 In social network analysis it is important for researches to analyze populations, as 
opposed to samples of populations, because it is mathematically uncertain what it means 
to take a random sample of relationships. For that reason, we have opted to study the 
complete population of the first session of the 110th Congress (2007) and its House 
legislative caucuses. We have chosen the 110th Congress because it is the most recent 
completed congress.  Although the 110th Congress is a congress in which party control 
changed power, we do not have any reason to believe that the 110th Congress is an 
anyway sufficiently different from prior congresses such that we could not generalize 
from these results.iii  Determining the population of caucuses and their members is a 
somewhat ambiguous, and certainly challenging, task. 
The caucus data for this project comes from the 2008 Winter edition of the 
Congressional Yellowbook. This directory includes descriptive entries for each member 
of the 110th Congress and lists the self-reported caucus memberships for each legislator. 
We used these data to construct a complete population of the caucuses and caucus 
memberships for the 110th Congress because no comprehensive list of caucuses and their 
members exists. The House Committee on Administration lists 276 “official” caucuses on 
their website. These groups have registered with the committee as official House groups 
that follow specific guidelines; however, hundreds more groups are known to exist. The 
Congressional Research Service generated a list of caucuses in the 110th Congress in the 
spring of 2008 and listed 394 House or joint caucuses. However, our search of self-
reported caucus memberships from the Yellowbook survey includes 559 distinct 
caucuses.iv We therefore constructed various samples of caucuses (i.e., those with more 
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than 2 members, those with more than 4 members, those that only appear in the CRS 
report, those that only appear on the House Administration website, etc.) and conducted 
all analyses on all samples. We have found no substantive differences in these results and 
therefore report results from the sample of caucuses that have 2-or more members, which 
includes 452 caucuses. All discussion below is about the complete membership of these 
452 caucuses. 
 
Social Network Analysis 
To analyze the caucus-based network in the House of Representatives, we have 
generated a relational matrix consisting of the members of the House of Representatives 
in which the ties between persons are determined on the basis of membership in the 
House caucuses (Borgatti, et al. 2002). The resulting "caucus network" uses common 
membership in one or more caucuses as a measure of strength. In other words, we are 
looking at an n x n adjacency matrix A (here: 438 x 438), representing all the caucus-
based ties in a network for the 110th Congress such that aij represents the total number of 
joint caucus memberships. Aij = 0 if the ith legislator does not share membership in any 
caucuses with the jth legislator and 1 ≤ aij ≤ 54 if he or she does (54 is the maximum 
number of joint caucus memberships of any two members). Our data are undirected, or 
symmetric: if actor A and actor B are in at least one caucus together, then they are 
connected and we make no assumptions about the direction of their connection.  
Given the large number of caucuses, and the inclination of Congressmen and 
Congresswomen to join a substantial number of them, it is not surprising to find that the 
resulting network is quite dense, as 93 percent of all possible ties are present. This high 
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density makes for a great degree of “reachability”: all actors can “reach” one another 
through the caucus network. Moreover, the great majority of them are directly connected 
to one another, as the average geodesic distance (describing the shortest possible “walk” 
from one actor to another) is 1.066. Everyone in the Congress can be reached within 2 or 
fewer steps, and most (93.4 percent) in one single step.  
The network density for Democrats and Republicans is quite high, but higher for 
Democrats at 96 percent, compared to 90 percent for Republicans. In other words, 
Democrats are more connected with each other in the caucus network than Republicans. 
This may be a reflection of the fact that the Democrats held the majority in the 110th 
Congress.  For the two parties, we also seek to identify the number of ties that exist 
between network members from the same party relative to the number of ties between 
members who are not from the same party. The External-Internal (E-I) index takes the 
number of ties between members of one party to members of other parties, subtracts the 
number of ties between members of the same party, and divides by the total number of 
ties. The resulting index ranges from -1 (all ties are internal to the group) to +1 (all ties 
are external to the group). This index shows a prevalence of internal (92,090 or 52%) 
over external (85,790 or 48%) ties, yielding an E-I index of -0.04: members of the House 
are thus slightly more connected within their party than across parties. The caucus 
network is thus characterized by a modest degree of homophily, the tendency of 
individuals to form ties with similar others. 
To measure the level of connectedness between any two actors more 
comprehensively, we rely on the concept of maximum flow, which considers how many 
actors that are directly adjacent to node A lead to pathways to node B. If this number is 
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large, A and B are more connected, since there are numerous ways for them to reach each 
other.v The maximum flow algorithm thus takes into account all connections between all 
actors, not just the most direct paths between actors. Maximum flow measures for 
Congress range from 0 to 6766, with an average of 2026.84 (standard deviation 1107.2). 
The pairs of Congressmen that have the highest maximum flow scores are listed in Table 
1. It is notable that these dyads are comprised exclusively of Democrats. In fact, the only 
Republicans that appear in the top 100 most connected dyads are Rep. English 
(Pennsylvania-3rd) and Rep. Wilson (South Carolina-2nd). 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
We can also observe that three legislators are particularly closely connected: Rep. 
Waxman (Democrat, California-30th), Rep. Van Hollen (Democrat, Maryland-8th), and 
Rep. Doggett (Democrat, Texas-25th). In the jargon of social network analysis, these 
three form an F-group, that is, a group of legislators who are connected to each other 
through particularly strong ties, which is defined as the largest number of ties that exists 
between any three or more actors in the whole network (52 in the case at hand). Also very 
closely connected to this trio is Rep. Moran (Democrat, Virginia-8th) with whom the 
three form a four-actor group based on 47 joint caucus memberships. Rep. Van Hollen 
currently serves as the Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 
meaning his chief job is to help raise money for his colleagues—being well connected is 
a certain asset for this job. 
These names also appear among the list of most central actors in the network. 
There are several ways of measuring centrality within networks; here, we use two. First, 
we are interested in determining which actors have more ties than other actors. An actor 
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with more ties might be considered more powerful than an actor with fewer ties, because 
more ties mean more avenues of access for information. For this we use degree centrality 
(Proctor and Loomis 1951; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Our second measure, 
Bonacich’s eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972), does not merely examine the number 
of connections that Member A has within the network, but also takes account of the 
connectedness of those actors Member A is connected with. That is, the centrality of 
Member A is a function of her own connections, as well as the connections of those 
adjacent to her.vi Table 2 lists the 20 most central actors in the Congress network. 
Notably, several of the names we saw in the connectedness measures above also make it 
to the top of the list of most central actors (Rep. Waxman, Rep. McNulty, Rep. McIntyre, 
Rep. Doggett, Rep. Hinchey, Rep. McDermott, Rep. Van Hollen).  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Before we use our data to test our hypotheses about the structure of the caucus 
network, we would like to verify that using caucus memberships to describe patterns of 
relationships between legislators is logical and meaningful in expected ways.  We 
therefore look for four expected relationships in the social network data.  First, we expect 
that legislators from the same party will be more connected in the caucus network.  If we 
did not find this to be true, we would question the validity of our data.  Second, we 
expect that ideologically close legislators will be more connected to one another in the 
caucus network than legislators who are ideologically distant.  Third, we expect that pairs 
of legislators who served more terms together will be more connected.  Since serving 
more term concurrently provides the potential for more direct and social interaction, we 
would be surprised if we did not find this relationship in the data.  Finally, we expect that 
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pairs who serve on more committees together will be more connected to one another. 
Committee service provides the opportunity for (potential) social interaction and we 
expect that the more legislators have had this opportunity the more likely they are to be 
socially connected to one another. 
To confirm these expected, benchmark relationships we use maximum flow as a 
measure of connectedness between legislators and Bonacich’s eigenvector centrality as a 
measure of centrality. Regarding party, we find that legislators from the same party are 
significantly more connected in the caucus network than pairs of legislators from 
different parties (maximum flow = 2078.5 versus 1974.7, t = -14.52, pr(t)=0.00).  Next, 
we expected Representatives who are close to one another ideologically to be more 
closely connected within the network. Using Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE scores to 
measure ideological distance, we find that legislators who are less than the population 
mean of .54 units apart from each other ideologically are more connected to one another 
than legislators who are more distant (maximum flow = 2087 versus 1964.3, t = 17.11, 
pr(t)=0.00).  Third, we expect that legislators who have served more terms together will 
be more closely connected in the network. Comparing the mean connectedness of dyads 
where legislators have served less and more than the population mean of 3.87 terms 
confirms this expectation: pairs of legislators that have served more than 3.87 terms 
together are more connected to one another (maximum flow = 2600) than pairs who have 
jointly served fewer than average terms (maximum flow = 1533.86, t = 170, pr(t)=0.00). 
We did not find support for our final benchmark relationship regarding committee 
service.  We had expected that legislators who together serve on the same committee(s) 
should be more connected in the caucus network, but the analysis shows that dyads of 
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legislators who are on at least one committee together have an average connectedness of 
2004.84, which is statistically significantly less than the average connectedness of 
legislators who do not serve on any committees together (2032.97, t = 3.25, pr(t) = 0.00). 
This negative effect is even more pronounced for legislators who serve on two or more 
committees together. Here, the average connectedness is 1907.09, which is statistically 
significantly less than the average connectedness score of 2028.8 for dyads of legislators 
who serve on one or no committees together (t = 4.28, pr(t) = 0.00). The finding that the 
voluntary membership in caucuses does not match up with committee assignments 
suggests that self-selection into caucuses entails greater preference coherence among 
caucus members than formal committee membership.  Also, these results may be skewed 
by the distribution of this variable since 78 percent of dyads share no committee seats. 
Only 20 percent of dyads have one committee in common and 1.5 percent of dyads have 
two committees in common.  While we did not find the expected relationship regarding 
committee service, in general our benchmark expectations held true, giving us greater 
confidence in the reliability of these data and the strength of the inferences we can draw 
from them. 
 
While this social network analysis provides some intriguing insights into the 
caucus-based network in the House of Representatives, it has not yet addressed our 
expectations, laid out above, about who is connected to whom within the caucus network. 
Table 3 shows the results of T-tests we used to test our hypotheses.vii  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
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The second part of the social network analysis focuses on our theoretical 
proposition about the social utility of participation in the caucus network, which 
contradicts the argument of the existing literature that the caucus system constitutes an 
alternative institutional structure that allows the formally disadvantaged to advance their 
interests and positions in the legislature. Our expectation was that the caucus structure 
does not benefit those in structurally weak positions in the formal institutional framework 
of parties and committees, but that it replicates and reinforces the formal distribution of 
power as rank-and-file members seek to build and maintain relationships with already 
powerful and influential colleagues. Our two key hypotheses concerned the relative 
connectedness and centrality of legislative leaders and non-leaders on the one hand, and 
senior and junior legislators on the other. While we expected that leaders and more senior 
legislators should be both more connected and central (Hypotheses 1 and 2), the extant 
literature maintains that this should be the case for non-leaders and junior legislators.  
The analysis confirms our expectations and undermines the propositions of 
previous research on caucuses in the House. First, we find that dyads where at least one 
member holds a leadership position have a higher average connectedness score (of 
2150.34) than dyads where neither member holds such a position (1991.28). Dyads where 
both members are party leaders, meanwhile, have an even higher connectedness score, at 
2298.46, compared to a connectedness score of 2023.03 for dyads where one or neither 
member is a leader (t = -9.0, pr(t) = 0.00). In terms of centrality, we find that the 52 party 
and committee leaders in the population of 438 legislators are more central in the network 
than non-leaders. This result is only marginally statistically significant at the 0.075 level, 
however.viii 
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Second, the average connectedness for dyads where neither member has served 
more than the population average of 6.16 terms is 1731.7, while the average 
connectedness for dyads where at least one member has served more than 6.16 terms is 
2183.28, a statistically significant difference. In other words, more senior legislators are 
more connected within the caucus network. This effect is even more pronounced for 
dyads where both members have served longer than the population mean, as the average 
connectedness of these pairs of Representatives is 2525.50 (t = -64.01, pr(t) = 0.00). 
Senior members are also more central than junior members. The average Bonacich 
Eigenvector Centrality value for members who have been members of the House for 
longer than the average 6.16 terms is 6.9, compared to 5.3 for members who have served 
less than the average number of terms (t = -5.54, pr(t) = 0.00). Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
Third, we used electoral vulnerability as an indicator of structural weakness.  We 
hypothesized, contrary to existing literature, that electorally safe legislators would be 
more connected and more central in the caucus network.  Evidence shows support for 
hypothesis 3.  We consider a legislator to be electorally vulnerable if she has won her 
most recent election with a vote share of 55 percent or less.ix Electorally vulnerable 
members are less connected in the network. The average connectedness of dyads where 
neither member is vulnerable is 2044.24, while the connectedness of dyads where at least 
one member is vulnerable is 1313.6 (t = -31.28). If both members are vulnerable, their 
mean connectedness score is 1370.96, which is statistically less than connectedness in 
dyads where one or neither member is vulnerable (2048.66) (t = 33.6, pr(t) = 0.00). 
Finally, electorally vulnerable members are less central in the caucus network, with an 
average Bonacich Eigenvector Centrality score of 4.13. This compares to 6.30 for 
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members who are electorally safe. These findings suggest that vulnerable members do 
not use caucuses to improve their electoral fortunes in the future by signaling to their 
constituents both their policy priorities and their activism. Instead, they appear reluctant 
to join caucuses, which raises questions about the extent to which structurally 
disadvantaged legislators can use caucuses to improve their institutional positions.  
Perhaps it is the case that electorally safe legislators have the luxury of spending more 
time in Washington, D.C. cultivating relationships with their colleagues rather than 
spending it in the district wooing voters.  Whatever the reason, the results show that 
legislators with an electoral advantage have the additional advantage of being more 
central and more connected in the caucus network. 
The evidence presented thus far shows support for our contention that structurally 
disadvantaged legislators do not tend to use the caucus system as a means of advancing 
their status.  Our data allow us to further examine this result and determine whether 
legislators who may be at a social disadvantage because of gender or race use the caucus 
system differently than those who do not face such disadvantages.  Our expectation is 
that legislators who qualify as socially disadvantaged because of their descriptive 
characteristics will be no less disadvantaged in the network than those who are in the 
social majority (Caucasian males).  Our results support this expectation.  Dyads that 
include only Caucasian males are no more connected than dyads that include at least one 
woman or ethnic minority (African American, Asian American, Latino, or Native 
American).  The magnitude of these connections are not large (2028.47 versus 2025.13), 
and not statistically significant.  Moreover, male Caucasians are no more central in the 
network than females or minorities.  Legislators who are female or ethnic minorities have 
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a centrality score of 5.89 whereas legislators who do not fall into those categories have a 
score of 5.99—a difference that is not statistically significant.  These results suggest that 
legislators who may be at a social disadvantage because of their gender or race, do not 
use the caucus system to help them make-up the difference. 
 Our final analysis allows us to test the portions of our hypotheses that speak to the 
frequency with which members join caucuses.  The prior tests examined members’ 
connectedness and centrality in the network.  However, we are also interested in the 
number of caucuses legislators join.  As indicated above, our expectation is that leaders, 
senior members, and electorally safe members will join more caucuses, while women and 
ethnic minorities will not join significantly more caucuses than their counterparts. The 
results of a negative binomial model are presented in Table 4.  The dependent variable in 
this model is a count of the number of caucuses a legislator has joined. 
The results of the estimation show that legislators who have served more terms 
join more caucuses. This positive and statistically significant coefficient is consistent 
with expectations.  While we had no prior expectations about party affiliation, the results 
show that Democrats join more caucuses than Republicans.  This may be due to the fact 
that Democrats had a majority share of seats in the 110th Congress.  With respect to 
electoral vulnerability, the positive and significant coefficient is consistent with our 
hypotheses.  Legislators who win their elections by a greater electoral margin join more 
caucuses than those who win by smaller margins.  The results with respect to party and 
committee leaders, female legislators, and ethnic minority legislators are mixed.  The 
model in Table 4 includes an interaction of the terms for leaders and female or minority.  
This is because we suspect the rate with which women and minorities join caucuses may 
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be conditioned on whether they are party or committee leaders.  The 110th Congress has 
several female and minority leaders (e.g., Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Conyers, Chairman 
Rangel, etc.) and if our theory about caucus networks mirroring existing institutions is 
correct, then the relationship between leadership and female and minority legislators 
should be conditional.    
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on leaders indicates that 
Caucasian male party and committee leaders join relatively fewer caucuses than female 
and minority leaders.  This finding is not consistent with our expectations.  However, the 
coefficient merits further investigation because it is part of an interaction term (see 
discussion below).  In addition, the coefficient for “female and minority” shows that 
female and minority non-leaders do not join caucuses at levels that are significantly 
different from their counterparts.  This finding is consistent with our hypothesis 4 above.   
To provide further interpretation of these findings and the interaction term we 
generated marginal effects and predicted probabilities (Tomz, et al. 2001; King, et al. 
2000). After calculating the appropriate linear combinations and standard errors for the 
marginal effects of leadership and female/minority legislators we found that the only 
statistically significant effect is the effect of being a leader on caucus members for 
Caucasian men—and the coefficient is negative and significant (equivalent to the 
coefficient for “leader” in Table 4).  Moreover, the predicted probabilities are such that 
legislators who have a structural and social advantage (Caucasian, male, Democrats, 
long-serving, electorally safe, leaders) will join a predicted 39 caucuses.  Whereas, 
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legislators who are structurally advantaged (leaders, electorally safe, etc.), but who are 
also women or minorities will join a predicted 21 caucuses.  Legislators who have no 
structural advantage, but have the advantage of being a Caucasian male will join a 
predicted 38 caucuses.  Finally, a woman or minority legislator who has no structural 
advantage will join a predicted 21 caucuses.  We therefore predict that having the social 
advantage of being a Caucasian male will lead such legislators will join an average of 
38.5 caucuses; whereas having structural advantages such as leadership posts, electoral 
security, and many years of service will lead such legislators to join an average of 30 
caucuses.x 
The results regarding the propensity of legislators to join caucuses are therefore 
somewhat counter to our expectations.  They show that being a minority, in terms of 
gender or race, has a stronger effect on one’s probability of joining caucuses than being 
in the institutionally advantageous positions of leadership, majority party, electoral 
security, or longevity of service.  While the results are counter to our expectations, when 
put into context of the results regarding connectivity and centrality they provide an 
interesting nuance to the story.  We have found that party leaders, and others with 
institutional advantages, are more connected and more central in the caucus system, but 
not more likely to join caucuses.  This somewhat counterintuitive result suggests that 
those with institutional advantages act as caucus magnets.  While leaders themselves do 
not join more caucuses than non-leaders, they play a more critical role in the caucus 
system.  Those without such institutional advantages are therefore likely to join more 
groups in an attempt to get close to those with the advantages.  This puts the leaders in 
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the strong position of being critical to the network, in terms of centrality and 
connectivity, without having to join more groups.     
In sum, the results of the network analysis completely support our expectations 
with regard to leadership, electoral security, and length of service—legislators fortunate 
enough to have these characteristics on their side are more central and more connected in 
the caucus network.  This evidence is consistent with our theoretical framework that the 
caucus system mirrors the structure of existing legislative institutions such as parties and 
committees and the same actors are powerful in each system.  However, we also find 
evidence that leaders join fewer caucuses and women and minorities join more, even 
while women and minorities are not more central or more connected via the caucus 
system.  Those with social characteristics that put them at a disadvantage do seem to join 
more groups (perhaps in an attempt to make up for their social disadvantages), but being 
members of the extra caucuses has not moved them into positions that allow them to be 
more central or more connected than the powerful leaders.  All together, the evidence is 
generally consistent with our updated perception of the caucus system—it helps the 
powerful retain power. 
 
Conclusion 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, from a theoretical point of 
view, we conceptualize the caucus system as a social network. This deviates from 
previous research on informal groups in Congress, which favors individualistic 
explanations and disregards the role of social relations in shaping political behavior. Our 
conceptualization, however, challenges the proposition that caucuses are venues for 
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formally disadvantaged legislative actors to counter-balance their structural weakness by 
building their standing in the informal institutional framework of the caucus system. We 
maintain that participation in caucuses is about maximizing the social utility of one’s 
relationships within the institution, which implies that legislators seek to associate 
themselves with colleagues in positions of formal power. As a result, the caucus system 
replicates and reinforces, rather than supplements and challenges, the formal distribution 
of power in the legislature. 
From a substantive standpoint, our results support our theoretical propositions, 
which means that the conventional wisdom regarding the role of caucuses in the U.S. 
House of Representatives is in need of revision. Our empirical analyses, using the most 
extensive database of caucuses and caucus membership to date, demonstrates that 
caucuses are not organizations used by junior representatives, legislators from marginal 
districts, women, and non-party leaders to make an impact. Instead, our research confirms 
our expectation that caucuses are institutions that favor legislative leaders and senior 
members, who are both more central and more connected in the caucus network. This is 
an important finding if caucuses fulfill their designated functions of facilitating 
information exchange and helping to coordinate legislative action, since the caucus 
system does not appear to be an alternative venue for these activities that challenges the 
formal legislative structure.  Independently, we found that while congressional leaders 
are more central and more connected in the caucus system, they tend to join fewer 
caucuses than non-leaders, while women and minorities join more.  In tandem with the 
social network analysis, we interpret these results to mean that legislators with structural 
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advantages are caucus magnets and others have a tendency to join many groups in an 
attempt, perhaps, to have connections to the leaders and senior members. 
In methodological terms, our paper demonstrates the value of using social 
network analysis as a tool in investigating legislative politics and decision-making. We 
add to the burgeoning body of literature in political science that is borrowing 
sophisticated social network methods from other disciplines and adopting them to help 
answer questions of import and interest to scholars of politics. The inherent social 
connectedness of politics is intuitive but nearly wholly lacking from political science 
discourse. It is imperative that we integrate more rigorous theory and methods into the 
discipline that allow us to incorporate measures of relationships between actors into 
models that explain political behavior and institutions.  
This paper provides an important update to the existing literature in legislative 
politics.  Using a social network framework we demonstrate that informal legislative 
member organizations do not necessarily provide legislators who are institutionally weak 
a vantage point from which they can improve their position; rather, the same legislators 
that are powerful in the party and committee systems, are powerful in the caucus system.  
The insight we have provided about how legislators use the caucus system is a direct 
result of conceptualizing the caucus system as a social network.  This research helps to 
demonstrate the utility of such methods.  That being said, we have left open many areas 
for future research on this topic.  We have not addressed the roles that caucuses play in 
the legislative process.  Another important topic for future investigation concerns 
specifying the circumstances under which our propositions about the social utility of 
caucus membership hold. It may be the case, for example, that we can observe some of 
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the patterns highlighted in previous research when examining particular sub-samples of 
caucuses (e.g., especially active, important, or visible ones). In other words: much 
remains to be learned, and we hope to make a contribution to a greater understanding of 
this under-researched part of the literature both with this paper and in additional studies. 
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Table 1: Dyads with Highest Maximum Flow Scores 
 
Name Name Maximum Flow 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) 6766 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st) 6766 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st) 6766 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 6370 
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st) Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 6370 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 6370 
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6357 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6357 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6357 
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6357 
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6326 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd) 6326 
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, NewYork-22nd) Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 6326 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd) 6326 
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21th) Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd) 6326 
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22th) McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) 6323 
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 6323 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) 6323 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) 6323 
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st) McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) 6323 
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 6323 
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Table 2: Most Central Legislators in the Caucus Network 
 
Name 
Normalized Degree 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Eigenvector Centrality 
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th) 29.03636 15.14773 
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21th) 28.67192 14.75355 
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th) 28.67192 15.0483 
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th) 26.99381 14.20062 
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th) 26.93872 14.12669 
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22th) 26.80736 13.82869 
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th) 26.79464 13.24581 
Larsen, Rick (Democrat, Washington-2nd) 26.34545 13.57402 
English, Phil (Republican, Pennsylvania-3rd) 25.89626 12.92506 
Payne, Donald M. (Democrat, New Jersey-10th) 25.23095 13.20031 
Pallone, Frank, Jr. (Democrat, New Jersey-6th) 25.0784 13.02561 
Moore, Dennis (Democrat, Kansas-3rd) 25.02331 12.66654 
Smith, Adam (Democrat, Washington-9th) 24.7521 12.61438 
Wilson, Addison G. (Joe) (Republican, South Carolina-2nd) 24.15883 11.78937 
Holt, Rush D. (Democrat, New Jersey-12th) 23.98932 12.43882 
Capuano, Michael E. (Democrat, Massachusetts-8th) 23.71811 12.46857 
Moran, James P., Jr. (Democrat, Virginia-8th) 23.36215 12.21354 
Maloney, Carolyn B. (Democrat, New York-14th) 23.25621 12.10695 
Abercrombie, Neil (Democrat, Hawaii-1st) 22.73074 11.61301 
McGovern, Jim (Democrat, Massachusetts-3rd) 22.67141 11.87619 
 
 30 
Hypothesis Description Variable
Mean Connectedness 
(maximum flow)
Bonacich's 
Eigenvector 
Centrality T Pr(T) Result
Neither member of dyad is a leader 1991.28 -
At least one member of dyad is a leader 2150.34 -
Party/Committee Leaders - 6.55
Non-Leaders - 5.87
Neither member of dyad has served longer 
than mean terms (6.16)
1731.70 -
At least one member of dyad has served 
longer than mean terms (6.16)
2183.28 -
Senior members (served at least 6.16 terms) - 6.90
Junior members (served less than 6.16 terms) - 5.30
Neither member of the dyad is electorally 
vulnerable
2044.24 -
At least one member of the dyad is electorally 
vulnerable (won prior election with less than 
55%)
1313.6 -
Electorally vulnerable - 4.13
Electorally safe - 6.30
Both  members of the dyad are male and 
Caucasian
2028.47 -
At least one member of the dyad is a female or 
ethnic minority
2025.13 -
Male Caucasians - 5.99
Females and ethnic minorities (black, latino, 
asian, native american)
- 5.89
4 Female and ethnic minority legislators 
are no more central than male and 
Caucasian legislators
0.283 0.78 supported
3 Electorally vulnerable legislators are 
more central
-5.28 0.00 supported
4 Female and ethnic minority legislators 
are no more connected than male and 
Caucasian legislators
0.4669 0.64 supported
Table 3:  T-Tests for Hypotheses 1-4
3 Electorally vulnerable legislators are 
more connected
-31.28 0.00 supported
2 Senior members are more connected -61.2 0.00 supported
2 Senior members are more central -5.54 0.00 supported
1 Party/Committee Leaders are more 
connected
-18.55 0.00 supported
1 Party/Committee Leaders are more 
central
-1.44 0.08 supported
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coefficient z
0.0440
(0.0090)
-0.1633
(.0580)
0.0057
(0.0022)
-0.2353
(0.0974)
-0.0438
(0.0601)
0.2064
(0.1599)
2.9330
(.3515)
N 437
Log pseudolikelihood -1789.5
-1.5833
(.0846)
0.2053
(0.0174)
Table 4: Negative Binomial Results
ln(alpha)
alpha
Female or Minority -0.73
Electoral Vulnerability 2.62
Terms Served 4.9
Number of Caucuses 
Joined
Party (1 = Republican) -2.82
Female or Minority *  
Leader 1.3
Dummy variables for 49 states included but not 
reported; Robust, Huber-White standard errors 
reported in parentheses
Constant 8.34
Leader -2.41
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i
 We will use the term “congressional caucus” inclusively to refer to all informal legislative member 
organizations, informal groups, working groups, and task forces. We do not include formal party 
organizations, formal party committees, standing or ad hoc legislative committees. 
ii
 The exact number of caucuses in the U.S. House is dynamic and varies depending on the criteria one uses 
to determine caucuses. The House Committee on Administration lists 276 legislative member organizations 
on its website (http://cha.house.gov/member_orgs.aspx). However, several hundred other such 
organizations are known to exist. The Congressional Research Service lists 394 caucuses in their report 
(Mansfield 2008). The Congressional Yellowbook includes mentions of 559 distinct caucuses in the 
membership listings for individual legislators. 
iii
 To confirm this conjecture we analyzed the mean number of discharge petitions, days in session, and roll 
calls for the past 10 sessions of Congress (back to 1999).  We found no statistically significant difference 
between the 110th Congress and these prior Congress, with the exception of the bills introduced in the first 
session.  The 110th Congress had an unusually high number of bills introduced in the first session (2007), 
which is likely due to the change in party power after the 2006 elections.  However, we have no reason to 
believe that such increased activity would appreciably affect members’ decisions to join caucuses. 
iv
 This number surely includes some error because many legislators reported being members of groups with 
very similar names (e.g., the Medical Doctor’s Caucus, Medical Malpractice Caucus, and the Medical 
Malpractice Crisis Task Force all appear in the Yellowbook with only 1 member each). We assume many of 
the similarly-named groups are actually the same caucus but erred on the side of caution and conservatively 
assumed that each caucus listed by legislators was a “true” caucus—there are 108 caucuses that have 1 or 
fewer members. A caucus has zero members if it is listed in the CRS report as existing but never appears in 
the Yellowbook as having any members. 
v
 The logic of this measure suggests that it is the availability of pathways between actors that makes a 
linkage strong, as opposed to distance or some other measure of connectedness. For example, if member A 
needs to send a message to member Z and she can only use member C to send it, the connection between A 
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and Z is weak. On the other hand, if A can send a message to Z via C, D, E, F, or G, then the connection 
between A and Z is stronger (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
vi
 For more details, also see Fowler 2006, p. 465. 
vii
 We are unable to do a multivariate or regression analysis to test these hypotheses because the dependent 
variable we wish to test is a network measure. Using a measure of network centrality or connectedness as a 
dependent variable in a traditional regression model would violate the basic assumptions of regression and 
independence of observations (see Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Therefore, to test these 
hypotheses we have relied on descriptive network analysis and basic t-tests. 
viii
 Leaders include Speaker, Majority and Minority Leader, Majority and Minority Whip, Committee Chair 
and ranking committee member. 
ix
 We also considered a less conservative level of 60% and found similar results. 
x
 Predicted probabilities were generated using “Clarify” (Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King 
(2001). CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University, June 1. http://gking.harvard.edu) 
